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Abstract  
Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral 
manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of 
changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall 
budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this 
manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. In this paper, 
I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in 
Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the 
preelectoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential 
changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find 
that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted 
spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year 
preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the 
preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents 
who run high deficits before the election. 
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Common wisdom is that, as elections approach, elected oﬃcials increase gov-
ernment spending to improve the chances that they or their parties will be
reelected. Reports of pork spending growing in election years are common,
and the public seems to expect popular spending projects when elections
are imminent. For economists, however, the debate about the existence, ex-
tent and characteristics of this manipulation is hardly settled. Among the
many sticky points, there are inconsistencies between the idea of pre-electoral
increases in the government’s budget and both the actual dynamics of gov-
ernment spending and the behavior of voters. First, evidence of election-year
increases in government spending and the deﬁcit is at best mixed. Second,
increases of the size of the budget seem to hurt, rather than improve, an
incumbent’s chances of being re-elected.
Partly motivated by this empirical evidence, the models introduced in
Drazen and Eslava (2004a, 2004b) present a view where Political Budget
Cycles (PBC) take the form of a change in the composition, rather than the
size, of government spending. Before elections, speciﬁcg r o u p so fv o t e r sa r e
targeted with spending, while non-targeted types of expenditure contract
to avoid having the increase in targeted spending result in higher deﬁcits.
These targeted pre-electoral transfers are designed by the incumbent to signal
preference for certain, politically attractive, groups of voters. Although a
ﬁxed deﬁcit is exogenously imposed in that model, behind this assumption
is the idea that voters dislike deﬁcits, even though they like receiving goods
speciﬁcally targeted to them1.
Rogoﬀ (1990) also presents a model of PBC where electoral manipulation
can be reﬂected in a change in the composition of the budget. In his model,
voters have a preference toward high aggregate levels of spending, but can
only observe part of the public goods provided by the government. Incum-
bents then have incentives to increase the provision of visible public goods
before the election, possibly at the expense of other, less visible, types of
spending. This is done to signal high ability of the incumbent to provide
1In Drazen and Eslava’s models, incumbents have incentives to manipulate ﬁscal policy
before the election, even though voters are fully rational and forward looking. Voters are
assumed to posses only limited information about the ﬁscal preferences of the incumbent.
Given this assumption, they react to past ﬁscal policy because it provides information
about the amount of targeted expenditure the incumbent will provide in the future if
re-elected.
2elevated overall levels of public goods.
Both views of electoral cycles suggest that empirical analyses of the PBC
that focus solely on the dynamics of the overall budget —as is the case in
most of the literature— are at risk of misinterpreting the evidence, besides
missing an important part of the action. For one, electoral manipulation of
government expenditures may occur without impacting the overall budget
or the deﬁcit. Moreover, the eﬀect of elections on the dynamics of govern-
ment spending is inextricably linked to the preferences of voters and their
ability to observe the ﬁscal choices of the government. These preferences and
sets of information may vary from country to country, and learning about
them is crucial for an adequate interpretation of the evolution of the budget
around election times. Do voters like or dislike large budgets? Do they have
preferences for speciﬁc types of spending over others? Put simply, even con-
tractions of government expenditure before elections may be consistent with
electoral incentives, if they are what the preferences of voters dictate.
In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and electoral out-
comes in Colombia to examine the characteristics of PBCs, in terms of both
voting behavior and government spending2. I ask whether election outcomes
are consistent with voters having diﬀerent preferences toward diﬀerent types
of government expenditure. From the point of view of policy, meanwhile, I
look at evidence on pre-electoral changes of government expenditures. Spe-
cial emphasis is put on the separate analysis of diﬀerent types of government
expenditure, since both the popular Rogoﬀ (1990) model and the models
introduced in Drazen and Eslava (2004a, 2004b) suggest the potential im-
portance of composition eﬀects. I ﬁnally tackle the question of whether the
extent of electoral eﬀects on ﬁscal policy depends on the degree of party
polarization among voters.
This paper is organized as follows. I begin by discussing some relevant
empirical literature in section 2. Section 3 comments on some interesting
features of the Colombian case, to motivate the focus on this country. The
pre-electoral dynamics of government spending are analyzed in section 4,
while section 5 studies the eﬀect of ﬁscal behavior on election outcomes.
While the other empirical sections focus on Colombian municipalities, some
evidence at the central government level is introduced in section 6. Finally,
section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2This paper focuses solely on the electoral manipulation of government expenditures,
without dealing with potential electoral cycles in the revenue side.
32 A discussion of previous empirical litera-
ture
Two bodies of past empirical work are relevant for the questions I address
in this paper: literature on ﬁscal preferences of voters, and literature on the
dynamics of ﬁscal policy around election times.
The ﬁrst of these branches of work examines how ﬁscal policy aﬀects the
incumbent’s chances of being reelected. Brender (2003) uses data on the elec-
tions of local mayors in Israel, and ﬁnds that voters penalize election year
increases in deﬁcits, although they reward high expenditure in development
projects. Peltzman (1992) shows that, in the US, the share of votes received
by the incumbent’s party is decreasing in government current (as opposed
to capital) expenditures. This result, however, loses power if investment in
roads, an important component of public investment, is included in the pol-
icy variable3. For OECD countries, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) ﬁnd
that governments that adopt tight ﬁscal policies do not suﬀer falls in popu-
larity and are not penalized by voters in the polls. In short, this literature
suggests that elected oﬃcials do not receive electoral beneﬁts from boost-
ing spending before elections. If anything, the opposite seems true. Not all
types of government spending generate the same opposition, however: some
development projects actually appear to increase political support for the
incumbent.
A second group of relevant empirical papers examines the dynamics of ﬁs-
cal policy, looking for systematic changes that coincide with election times.
The most comprehensive studies are those by Schuknecht (1994), Shi and
Svensson (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2002), and Brender and Drazen
(2003), all of which undertake studies for large samples of countries. Ex-
cept for Schuknecht’s paper, this work focuses solely on aggregate measures
of ﬁscal policy4: total spending5,t a xr e v e n u e ,a n dd e ﬁcits.
3The author interprets the “odd ﬁndings” obtained when including expenditure in
roads as a result of the high lumpiness of this component. An alternative interpretation,
consistent with the models of Eslava and Drazen (2004a, 2004b), is that roads are clearly
targeted public goods and voters react favorably to being targeted by the incumbent.
4Persson and Tabellini (2002) also include a more disaggregate component of spending,
given by welfare programs, but do not contrast with other categories of spending.
5The measure of spending used in Shi and Svensson’s paper is actually government
consumption spending from national accounts. I ﬁnd results with this measure diﬃcult
to interpret as it includes diﬀerent levels of government (local, national, publicly owned
4Results in Schuknecht (1994) and Shi and Svensson (2000) point at pre-
electoral deteriorations of ﬁscal balances and increases of public expendi-
tures in developing countries. Later results, however, are not so favorable
to the existence of electoral cycles in total government spending. Persson
and Tabellini’s (2002) results show no pre-electoral change of government
expenditure or surplus for their overall sample, and an electoral contraction
of spending in countries with majoritarian systems. Meanwhile, Brender and
Drazen (2003) show that Shi and Svensson’s ﬁnding of PBCs in total spending
is driven solely by new democracies: there is no evidence of electoral manipu-
lation in countries with a long history of democratic institutions. They argue
that ﬁscal cycles in new democracies reﬂect underdeveloped media and poor
accounting practices. In sum, the evidence in favor of pre-electoral increases
in total government spending and government deﬁcits is, at best, mixed. Fur-
thermore, it seems that politicians only engage in spending hikes when voters
cannot eﬀectively monitor government balances, a behavior that is consistent
with voters being opposed to raising overall spending.
In terms of the composition of expenditures, Schuknecht(1994) ﬁnds that,
prior to elections, capital expenditures rise as a share of both GDP and overall
expenditure in his sample of 35 developing countries. Kneebone and McKen-
zie (2001) ﬁnd no pre-electoral increases in aggregate spending for Canadian
provinces, but do ﬁnd that spending in social services, industrial develop-
ment, and health actually contract before elections. Very similar ﬁndings
are reported for Mexico by M. González (2001), who also ﬁnds that other
categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract prior to elections.
In short, pre-electoral manipulation of the budget is concentrated in some
speciﬁc categories of government spending. For the countries covered in these
studies, it would appear that capital expenditures are seen by politicians as an
eﬀective way to impress voters, and that oﬃcials attempt to take advantage
of this fact6.M o r e o v e r ,o ﬃcials seem to ﬁnd ways to increase these expen-
ditures prior to elections without increasing overall spending, thus avoiding
being penalized by voters who are ﬁscal conservatives.
The picture that emerges from this ﬁndings is far from supportive of the
widespread idea that oﬃcials expand government expenditure prior to elec-
enterprises), which should respond to diﬀerent types of elections and in diﬀerent ways.
6Alesina et al. (1998) assert that “cuts in public invesment are less visible and [po-
litically] costly [than cuts in other spending] ”, but provide no evidence that this is the
case. The evidence just discussed, as well as the results I present in this paper, point in
the opposite direction, at least for the countries covered by these studies.
5tions. While voters seem to penalize such increases, there is no robust evi-
dence that overall spending is manipulated in this way. However, expenditure
increases are actually observed for some types of spending. An important
contribution of this paper is to put these apparently contradictory pieces to-
gether and show how they can be reconciled. In contrast to previous work,
I analyze both voting behavior and the dynamics of government budgets as
two parts of the same problem, and focus on the idea that not all types of
government spending should be treated equally in this analysis. This paper
also proposes that some speciﬁc components of the government accounts are
more likely than others to reﬂect types of expenditure that generate large
eﬀects in electoral support. In that spirit, another contribution of this pa-
per is a systematic analysis of diﬀerential eﬀects of elections on the various
components of overall public spending.
3 The Colombian case
Colombia oﬀers an interesting case for the study of these issues, as an example
of a developing economy with a relatively well established democracy7.W h i l e
part of the literature has argued that electoral cycles in the overall budget are
a phenomenon of developing countries, Brender and Drazen (2004) show that
the key distinction is not between developed and developing economies, but
between established and new democracies. Thus, although the traditional
view would predict pre-election hikes of government spending in a country
like Colombia, Brender and Drazen’s argument would suggest otherwise.
Even though I do present some evidence on the central government’s bud-
get, the main focus in this paper is on spending behavior by local govern-
ments. I choose this “cross-district” approach, rather than the more usual
cross-country strategy for two reasons. First, the PBC models of Drazen
and Eslava (2004a,2004b) suggest the importance of distinguishing between
targeted and non-targeted types of expenditure. This distinction is most
relevant at the local level, where expenses can be targeted most eﬃciently.
7The statement that Colombia is a “well established democracy” may be puzzling for
the reader, in view of the intense armed conﬂi c tt h a th a sb l e dt h ec o u n t r yf o ry e a r s .
However, from the point of the institutional regime, Colombia has enjoyed the rule of
democracy practically without interruption since the 19th century. This is not a minor
achievement in the Latin American context, where most countries went through long and
painful periods under the rule of dictators, even in the last decades of the 20th century.
6Second, the view in this paper is that the ﬁscal preferences of voters play a
key role in determining the PBC. This creates the potential for widely dif-
ferent forms of electoral budget manipulations from country to country, and
suggests the convenience of limiting the analysis to a single country, where
general features of the political system that are diﬃcult to control for do not
vary8.
I should point that, although in Colombia the direct reelection of incum-
bent executive oﬃcials is banned, pre-electoral manipulation of ﬁscal ﬁnances
is regarded as a usual political practice. PBCs are thought to arise in Colom-
bia largely due to the actions of the legislative bodies, whose members are in
fact subject to direct re-election (in the case of city councils), or at least have
found ways to circumvent formal restrictions to run for direct re-election (as
in the national Congress). There are also reasons why even an incumbent
mayor, who cannot run for re-election immediately, would want to manipu-
late ﬁscal policy at the end of his period in oﬃce. Most importantly, voters
identify the preferences of the oﬃcial with those of his party or his designated
candidate, and therefore the policy decisions of an oﬃcial are interpreted as
signals of party preferences and competence. Hence, the incumbent knows
that his decisions aﬀect his party’s re-election chances (or those of his pre-
ferred candidate).
4 The electoral dynamics of government spend-
ing
In this section, I analyze evidence of pre-electoral manipulation of public
spending in Colombian municipalities, with special emphasis on contrast-
ing diﬀerent types of expenditure. In particular, the models introduced in
Drazen and Eslava (2004a, 2004b) suggest important diﬀerences between tar-
geted expenditures and other components of the budget. I try to unveil such
diﬀerences using the disaggregate components of government accounts.
Following much of the literature, I estimate equations in which the policy
variables are represented as functions of the timing of elections, as well as
other controls. The basic relationship can be written as:
8Note that the within-country strategy does not wipe out the sources of variation in the
institutional environment that are necessary to identify key characteristics of the PBC; in
particular, the degree of ideological commitment to one or other party does exhibit wide
variation across districts of the same country.
7yit = ai + b1 ∗ yit−1 + b2 ∗ yit−2 +
X
k
ck ∗ xk,it + d ∗ elecdumit + εit (1)
where i is an index for districts, yit is (the log of) some speciﬁct y p eo f
spending by the local government of city i in period t, ai is a district eﬀect,
and the x are control variables (indexed by k t oa l l o wt h eu s eo fm o r et h a n
one control). The variable elecdum is a political dummy that captures the
timing of elections, and it is the center of the analysis. It takes a value of 1
in periods preceding local elections, and 0 in all other periods.
The autoregressive form is used in the literature on political cycles as a
parsimonious representation of the policy choices, given the lack of elements
to incorporate a fully structural model of ﬁscal policy. However, I also include
additional controls to account for as much variability in the data as I can. I
estimate a separate regression for each type of government expenditure (that
is, each type of government expenditure is a diﬀerent y). In all regressions,
the main interest is d,t h ec o e ﬃcient that captures the eﬀect of elections.
The traditional view in empirical studies of political budget cycles is that
we should observe pre-electoral increases in overall spending and at least
some of its disaggregate categories (d>0 for at least some y0s, d<0 for no
category). Most empirical studies have focused on this hypothesis. Theoret-
ical models discussed above, however, suggest the possibility that the PBC
takes the form of a pre-electoral change in the composition of the budget.
In particular, Drazen and Eslava (2004a, 2004b) suggest that government
resources are shifted away from non-targeted spending and into targeted
projects (d>0 for targeted spending, d<0 for some other categories). A
systematic analysis of the eﬀects on diﬀerent categories of spending may help
to shed some light on the empirical validity of this idea.
A classiﬁcation of government expenditure into targeted and non-targeted
expenses is not readily available, or straightforward. In fact, all government
expenses (probably with the exception of interest payments on external debt)
generate beneﬁts for at least some groups in society, even if it is only to those
individuals who provide the services and goods to the government. However,
my view is that some of the components of expenditure that governments
report separately, in particular most categories of investment expenditures,
are more likely than others to reﬂect targeted expenses.
Opportunistic targeted expenditures, close to the familiar concept of pork
barrel spending, are most often associated with projects of infrastructure de-
8velopment: construction of roads, schools, water plants. These are highly
visible expenditures that beneﬁts p e c i ﬁc (yet potentially large) groups of
voters. On the other hand, some current expenditures, such as purchases
of supplies and services or payments to other governmental entities, as well
as interest payments, can be presumably cut without visibly hurting large
groups of voters. Under this interpretation, data that separates current gov-
ernment spending from expenditures linked to development projects could ﬁt
the need for distinguishing targeted from non-targeted expenditures9.T h e
theory of electoral changes in the composition of the budget is seen here
as consistent with some components of current spending contracting prior to
elections, with a simultaneous expansion of categories related to development
projects10.
4.1 Data
The data consist of annual observations for each Colombian municipality
(close to 1100 cross-sectional units) for the period 1987-2000, as municipal
9It is important to highlight that, consistent with my view that PBC’s take diﬀerent
forms in diﬀerent countries depending on the preferences of voters, I do not claim that the
correspondence between investment components and targeted spending should apply for
all countries. I believe this is an appropriate classiﬁcation for the Colombian case, and part
of the empirical literature discussed above seems to suggest it is also applicable for other
cases. What I do postulate as a more general feature is that there are speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s
of the government accounts that can be identiﬁed with the public goods voters are more
interested in.
I use a panel of yearly data on government accounts for all municipalities in Colombia
over the 1984-2000 period. Expenditures are reported at a relatively high level of detail,
allowing me to discern the behavior of diﬀerent types of spending.
10This statement may seem conﬂicting with Rogoﬀ’s (1990) paper, where visible spend-
ing (the category that expands before elections) is called government “consumption”, while
the less visible good, which the author links to as spending in national defense and ﬁnan-
cial activities, is referred to as “government investment”. When taking the model to the
data, however, the author’s of words may be misleading, at least for some countries. In
the Colombian case, less visible expenditures such as defense, payments to pensioned em-
ployees, and oﬃce supplies are all recorded under the consumption or “current spending”
categories. Highly visible types of projects, like the construction of bridges, schools, and
water plants, are all under the “investment” heading. The multi-period character of these
projects raises a question about whether politicians are able to time them so that voters
observe them before the election. Common wisdom, the existing empirical evidence, and
the evidence I present here all seem to suggest that they are.
9oﬃcials have been elected by popular vote only since 198811. Of the 16 years
in the sample, 6 are local election years, when mayors and city councils are
elected12. Elections occur at predetermined dates, and all cities hold elections
the same day. A "pre-election period" (that in which the election dummy is
1) is the year previous to the election if the election takes place in the ﬁrst
semester, and the year of the election if the election is held in the second
semester.
The data on government spending come from the Colombian Contraloría
General, a public entity with the task of monitoring public ﬁnances. Since the
use of these data is a novel feature of this paper, I will discuss features of the
database in some detail. The ﬁnancial report a local government ﬁles with the
Contraloría contains a detailed description of its revenues and expenditures,
so that disaggregate measures are available. The general structure of the
expenditure accounts available is summarized in the ﬁrst column of Table
1. Besides the categories listed in Table 1, I also examine investment in
roads, which is a subcomponent of infrastructure investment13,a n ds o m e
subcomponents of personnel payments and current transfers. Development
projects show up mostly in the investment categories. Given the discussion
above, I associate these categories with targeted expenditures.
Table 1 also presents summary statistics for the diﬀerent categories of
spending I analyze.14 For each type of expenditure, the ﬁrst row refers to
the overall period, the second row to pre-electoral periods, and the third row
to other periods. All measures are in hundreds of thousands of 1998 prices.
Most current expenditure categories display lower averages in pre-electoral
p e r i o d st h a ti no t h e rp e r i o d s ,w h i l et h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o rm o s ti n v e s t m e n t
categories, in particular those associated with the development of infrastruc-
11Data for previous years, however, are available. This allows me to use lags of the
variables as instruments, and run the regressions in diﬀerences, without losing observations
(see explanation of the estimation strategy below).
12Mayors and councils are elected simultaneously. A list of the local elections held in
the 1988-2000 period is presented in the appendix.
13“Infrastructure” includes the construction of roads, urban infrastructure, and con-
struction of market places.
14I use all the available information. Current expenditure and its broader subcategories,
as well as total investment, are available for more than 90% of the districts in years prior
to 1997, and for close to 80% of the districts after that. The disaggregation of investment
is only available since 1990. When disaggregations are reported, I check for consistency
between more aggregate categories and their subcategories, and discard observations with
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Figure 1: Evolution of spending: broad categories
ture (infrastructure, water and energy, housing). These observations suggest
pre-electoral changes in the composition of spending, in directions consis-
tent with the predictions of both the Rogoﬀ (1990) model and the budget
composition model of Drazen and Eslava (2004b). A more formal analysis is
undertaken in the following section.
T h ed y n a m i c so fd i ﬀerent categories of government spending can be seen
in Figures 1 and 2. The former contrasts current spending, and its sub-
components, with investment. The latter shows the diﬀerent categories of
investment, for the period in which disaggregated data are available (1990-
2000). Vertical lines indicate pre-election years, as deﬁned by the variable
elecdum. Note, in particular, peaks in pre-election periods for infrastructure,
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Figure 2: Evolution of spending: investment categories
Table 2 lists the diﬀerent control variables I use in alternative speciﬁca-
tions. Each speciﬁcation uses a diﬀerent set of controls, to check the robust-
ness of results. Speciﬁcation (1) includes the log of state per capita GDP to
control for economic activity (GDP_PC), a quadratic time trend (T), and
some social indicators that could be used as inputs in ﬁscal policy decisions.
The latter include the log of population and the log of a poverty indicator
known as Unsatisﬁed Basic Needs (UBN). Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) use al-
ternative ﬁnancial indicators, trying to account for ﬁnancial constraints faced
by local governments. These constraints are particularly important in later
years, when the law has required that local governments in Colombia obtain
authorization from the central level to increase the size of their budgets if they
have been running deﬁcits in previous years. I use previous year’s Deﬁcit,
previous year’s Debt, and Fiscal Dependence indicators, all constructed from
the Contraloría data, to control for these ﬁnancial constraints15. Finally, in
speciﬁcation (4) I include Incumbent Advantage, measured by the percent-
15The Fiscal Dependence indicator, included in both speciﬁcation (2) and (3), accounts
for the level of ﬁscal decentralization in the country, which grew dramatically over this
period. It is increasing in the share of revenues represented by transfers from the central
government (as opposed to the local government’s own ﬁscal eﬀort).
12age share of votes received by the incumbent oﬃcial in the last election. I
try to account in this way for the greater degrees of freedom that a popular
incumbent has when choosing ﬁscal policy. The appendix provides sources
and more details on how these controls were generated.
4.2 Estimation strategy
When estimating 1, the following sequential moment restrictions, which cor-
respond to common assumptions in panel data studies, are assumed about
the error term:
E(εityit−s)=0for all t and for s ≥ 1 (2)
E(εitelecdumiv)=0for all v,t (3)
and
E(εitxit−w)=0for all t and for w ≥ w (4)
where w =0for control variables assumed not contemporaneously correlated
with the error term (incumbent advantage, the time trend, previous year’s
deﬁcit and debt, and the ﬁscal dependence indicator, given that it is an
aggregate-level indicator), and w =1for the opposite case.
Given the large number of cross-sectional units, estimating the city-
speciﬁce ﬀects (ai)s e p a r a t e l yi sd i ﬃcult. I therefore estimate 1 in ﬁrst-
diﬀerences16:
∆yit = b1 ∗ ∆yit−1 + b2 ∗ ∆yit−2 +
X
k
ck ∗ ∆xk,it + d ∗ ∆elecdumt + uit (5)
where
uit = ∆εit
Regression (5) is aﬀected by a familiar endogeneity problem: the error
term now includes εi,t−1 w h i c hi sc o r r e l a t e dw i t h∆yt−1 and some xit (speciﬁcally
16A ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator is not appropriate, as it would yield biased estimates given
the presence of autoregresive terms in the speciﬁcation. While lags of the endogenous
variables can be used as instruments in the ﬁrst-diﬀerences speciﬁcation to address this
problem, the same is not true in a ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation.
13lagged deﬁcit and lagged debt). It also includes εi,t which is correlated with
some of the xt,a ﬀected by contemporaneous ﬁscal policy. To address this
problem, I estimate 5 by GMM, using yi,t−s−1 and yi,t−s−2 to instrument the
∆yi,t−s,a n dxi,t−1 and xi,t−2 to instrument the ∆xi,t
17. Under the sequen-
tial moment conditions 2 through 4 these instruments are orthogonal to the
innovations. Regressions are weighted by the total size of the budget, to
give more importance to larger districts. The reason is that in smaller units
electoral ﬁscal choices may be more aﬀected by the logic of clientelism and
corruption than the logic of signaling.
4.3 Regression results
Results for the political dummy in which we are interested, d, are presented in
Tables 3 and 4.18 In these tables, each of columns (1) through (4) represents
ad i ﬀerent set of controls, as detailed in Table 2. Each row corresponds
t oad i ﬀerent regression, and the dependent variable for that regression is
recorded in the ﬁrst column. Throughout the paper, results in bold letters
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while results in bold and italics are signiﬁcant
at 10%. Dependent variables are expressed in logs.
I run two versions of equation (5). Table 3 presents results for the ﬁrst
of those versions, where yi,t corresponds to the share of total expenditure
represented by a speciﬁct y p eo fs p e n d i n g .F o ri n s t a n c e ,t h eﬁrst row reports
17The most widely used methodology is the one suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
The main diﬀerence with respect to the approach I use is that I do not treat each period
as a separate equation. There are two reasons why I do not use their approach. First,
with the relatively large numbers of periods (15) and endogenous variables (up to 5) in
my estimations, the Arellano-Bond estimation contains more than 60 instruments, even
if we only use two lags as instruments for each period. Besides being computationally
consuming, GMM estimators with such a large number of overidentifying restrictions are
known to have poor ﬁnite sample properties (see Wooldridge, 2002, for a discussion).
Second, I believe larger districts should be given more weight in my estimations. The
use of weighted regression in the Arellano-Bond approach is still not standard. The basic
results I highlight here are, however, robust to the use of Arellano-Bond techniques (with
unweighted regressions), although the set of instruments does not perform as well as under
the methodology I use. As an example, I report results from Arellano-Bond estimation for
one of my speciﬁcations in the Appendix. A complete set of results with this approach is
available from the author upon request.
18To facilitate reading, estimates for other coeﬃcients are not reported, but some addi-
tional results are reported in Tables A1 and A3, and the rest are available from the author
upon request.
14the estimate of d when the dependent variable is current expenditure as a
share of total expenditure. This is motivated by theoretical models that, as
mentioned, suggest pre-electoral changes in the composition of the budget.
Results point to a change in the composition of expenditure away from
current expenditures and into capital spending. The categories of invest-
ment associated with most visible infrastructure projects, namely construc-
tion of roads, infrastructure, and water, power, and communications, all show
pre-electoral expansions. These are signiﬁcant, both statistically and eco-
nomically; for instance, the share of expenditure dedicated to infrastructure
development grows by around 40% prior to elections. Other categories of in-
vestment, more related to the provision of universal (as opposed to targeted)
goods, as health and education, do not show similar pre-electoral cycles. At
the same time, there is a reduction of the share of resources dedicated to
servicing the debt, as well as a contraction of current spending. The lat-
ter can be attributed to a decrease in the share of the budget represented
by current transfers19, in particular the subcategory of transfers to retired
employees, and the share represented by payments to temporary workers (a
subcategory of Personnel). These ﬁndings are consistent with an opportunis-
tic pre-electoral expansion of targeted expenditures.
Although the choice of instruments is greatly restricted by data availabil-
ity, the set of instruments performs well. The relevance of the instruments
should not be of much concern, since most of these variables exhibit persis-
tence.20 Sargan test statistics in general do not reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are not correlated with the error term (see Table A1),
thus supporting the validity of instruments. Estimation residuals uit present
autocorrelation of ﬁrst, but not second order, thus supporting the hypothesis
that the εit are not autocorrelated. Sargan test statistics, numbers of ob-
servations, and estimates on the autoregressive terms are presented in Table
A1.
In terms of the robustness of results, note that they are consistent across
19This may seem puzzling, since the theoretical literature frequently refers to targeted
expenditures as transfers to the targeted groups. However, the reader should not con-
fuse these with “Current Transfers”, as deﬁn e di nt h eC o l o m b i a ng o v e r n m e n ta c c o u n t s .
These cover beneﬁts to retired and temporary employees, and transfers to other levels of
government. None of these is likely to constitute a group of voters worthy of pre-electoral
targeting.
20Regressions of most endogenous variables on the sets of instruments yield R-squared
close to 0.3
15sets of controls. They are also robust to changes in the sample, both in terms
of periods and districts covered. The same pattern of electoral eﬀects also
arises with an Arellano-Bond type estimation (see Table A2), although in the
latter the sizes of eﬀects are smaller, and the contraction of current categories
of spending extends to the "General" and "Personnel" categories.21
I repeat these regressions setting yit equal to the log level of expenditure
in a given category. That is, I look for eﬀects on spending amounts, rather
than shares of overall spending. Table 4 presents the results of this approach.
As in Table 3, spending on total investment, infrastructure, power, and roads
all show pre-electoral increases. The levels of current transfers, payments to
temporary workers and debt service, meanwhile, contract. These eﬀects are
large in size. For instance, investment expands about 10% before elections,
while transfers contract by close to 30% and interest payments by 10%. An
interesting result from these regressions is that payments to personnel in-
crease by about 8% prior to elections 22. The level of education expenditure
also increases signiﬁcantly before elections. Sargan test statistics, numbers
of observations, and estimates on the autoregressive terms are presented in
Table A3.
In sum, the results indicate a pre-election shift of government resources
from some categories of current spending into investment types of expendi-
tures. This is consistent with the view that incumbents try to obtain voters’
support by increasing the provision of goods that are most valuable and/or
visible to them, while trying to limit the impact of these actions on the over-
all budget23. Is this strategy optimal to tilt election outcomes in favor of the
incumbent? Trying to answer this question I now examine some empirical
21As highlighted in a footnote above, these results must be taken with more caution, as
the set of instruments is perhaps too large, and is not validated by Sargan tests.
22This result is driven by payments to permanent personnel ("permanent" in the sense
of having a long term contract). The ﬁnding of a pre-electoral expansion of this type of
spending would be consistent with the widespread idea that politicians in Colombia trade
government jobs in exchange for political support. If this is indeed driving the results, the
suggestion is that these hirings are done through long term contracts, which explains why
they could be interpreted as credible commitments by the incumbent.
23Models of electoral composition eﬀects make no prediction regarding total expenditure;
the eﬀect of elections on total spending is simply the sum of what happens to individual
categories. It is worth mentioning, however, that by estimating 5 with y equal to the log
of total expenditure, one obtains a small positive pre-electoral eﬀect. In speciﬁcations (1)
and (3) it is statistically signiﬁcant, but only around 3%. Moreover, in speciﬁcations 2
and 4 it is not even statistically signiﬁcant.
16evidence on the link between the government’s budget and election outcomes.
5 Do voters reward targeted spending?
The implicit foundation for the view that oﬃcials manipulate ﬁscal policy
before elections is that voters’ support for the incumbent is aﬀected by his
previous ﬁscal choices. The models presented in Drazen and Eslava (2004a,
2004b) suggest that a voter reacts favorably to increases in types of spending
he cares most about, even if he dislikes incumbents who run deﬁcits24.I n
Rogoﬀ’s (1990) model, an incumbent’s share of votes depends positively on
the provision of goods visible to voter, which they associate with higher
competence. Two obvious questions come to mind. Does recent ﬁscal policy
indeed aﬀect the choices of voters? If so, what are the directions of those
eﬀects? I devote this section to answering these questions.
5.1 Data
As argued before, the relevant deﬁnition of “incumbent” for the Colombian
case is the incumbent party, since oﬃcials cannot run for direct re-election.
I therefore use data on the share of votes obtained by each party in the local
mayor elections of 1992-2000 (four elections). Unfortunately, for previous
elections only the share of votes obtained by the winner of the election is
available, so that full party shares cannot be calculated25.
Politics in Colombia have been traditionally dominated by two major
parties, Liberal and Conservative. While some candidates, particularly in
the 1990’s, ran under the banner of a myriad of diﬀerent parties or political
movements, many of these movements can be traced back to the traditional
parties, and voters in each locality are frequently aware of those ties26.I n
24Models of competence inference (e.g. Rogoﬀ 1990 and Shi and Svensson 2001) may
also be consistent with voters punishing high deﬁcits, under the assumption that at least
some voters observe the overall budget. Informed voters associate higher deﬁcits, for any
given level of spending, with lower competence of the incumbent.
25It is often the case that several candidates run for the same party, so that the votes
received by one candidate cannot be assumed to equal the votes received by his party in
that election. As a result, the pre-1992 data cannot be used for our purposes.
26There are two reasons why candidates prefer to run for movements linked to the
parties, rather than the parties themselves. The ﬁrst is that by creating a new group they
17that sense, elections are still mainly a contest between these two major par-
ties, although there are also two smaller left-wing parties and some truly
independent political groups.
The challenge is to identify in the data which candidates are associated
with one of the major parties, in order to calculate the appropriate shares of
party votes. I use information from external sources, including informal ac-
counts, to match the diﬀerent movements with the traditional party division
between liberals and conservatives. The appendix contains a list of move-
ments and parties that I have been able to match with the larger parties. All
movements not listed in the appendix are considered “independents” in my
analysis.
I calculate the share of votes obtained by, for instance, the Liberal party,
as the sum of the shares obtained by all the smaller organizations linked to
the Liberal party in that list. Since some apparently independent groups
may indeed also be Liberal or Conservative, even if I am not able to identify
them as such, the share of votes my calculations assign to a given major
party is frequently (more than 25% of observations) equal to zero. I treat
those zero vote shares as missing values, since I suspect that most of these
cases do not reﬂect that a major party did not present any candidate, but
rather that I cannot tie a candidate to the party he belongs to. Table 5
presents some summary statistics; panel 1 refers to vote shares, and panel
2 to number of elections won. Columns (1) and (2) record statistics for
the Liberal and Conservative party, respectively, while column (3) shows
statistics for the predominant party in each election (between conservatives
and liberals). Figures in column (4) correspond to the winning candidate.
The high mean value of these shares results because the candidate of the
least favored party is more likely to run under an alternative banner, so that
it is easier to tie a candidate to his major party when he receives a large vote
share.27 The predominance of the two parties is conﬁr m e db yt h ef a c tt h a t ,
out of 3880 total elections, 2661 are won by a candidate that I can tie to
one of these parties. Votes to the predominant party tend to exceed those
can access funding that is available for each political organization in the race. The second
is that voters have grown suspicious of the political practices (not necessarily the ideals)
of the traditional parties. Candidates try to avoid being associated with those practices
by running outside the structure of the party.
27If I do not interpret the zero vote shares as missing values, therefore taking into
account those less favored candidates, the mean share for liberals and conservatives are
40% and 31%, respectively.
18obtained by the winning candidate, since often more than one candidate runs
for each party.
5.2 The eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on vote shares
I study here the relation between the share of total votes obtained by each of
the two major parties and pre-electoral ﬁscal policy. As in previous studies,
the eﬀect of the overall budget is captured by the government’s deﬁcits. How-
ever, I have already highlighted that some theoretical models suggest that
voters see targeted expenditures with a diﬀerent eye than they see the rest of
spending. I therefore attempt to distinguish the eﬀects of diﬀerent spending
categories. Following the previous discussion, I treat investment spending as
targeted expenditure, and current spending as non-targeted expenditure. I
run a regression of the following form:
votespit = α0 + α1votespit−1 (6)
+( α2investit + α3currentit + α4deficitit + α5grit) ∗ incpit−1 + vitp
The time indices here refer to election periods, so that t is the current
election and t−1 the previous election. votespit is the share (in percentages)
of votes obtained by party p in city i during the t election. Vote shares
are modeled as a function of the interaction between ﬁscal variables and the
discrete variable incpit−1,w h i c ht a k e st h ev a l u eo f1 if party p is in oﬃce at
the time of the election and −1 otherwise28.T h eﬁscal variables correspond
to the pre-election year; I include the log of investment spending (investit),
the log of current spending (currentit), and the per capita government deﬁcit
(deficitit). Average GDP growth between t−1 and t (grit) is also considered
to control for other observables that may aﬀect voters’ perceptions about the
incumbent.
Under the assumption that vitp captures the part of voting behavior that
the politician cannot predict, ﬁscal policy decisions cannot be based on those
innovations, and the policy variables included in the regression should satisfy
the restriction of being orthogonal to the error term. Assuming that there are
no components of vit that aﬀect the incumbent’s ﬁscal choices may indeed be
strong, but data restrictions make addressing these concerns a quite diﬃcult
task, beyond the reach of this paper.
28Results are robust to using a 1, 0 dummy rather than this 1, − 1 version.
19Results are reported in Table 6; column (1) reports estimates of (6),
while column (2) reports results of a slightly modiﬁed version that includes
party/state eﬀects29. The dependent variable is expressed as percentages,
while spending measures (investment and current expenditure) are logs of
per capita levels of spending. Column (3) reports results of speciﬁcation (6),
but the spending variable invest is measured as a fraction of total spending
(in this case, the corresponding fraction for current spending is not included
in the speciﬁcation due to concerns about collinearity of the regressors).
Robust standard errors are reported below the point estimates.
As previous studies have found for other countries (e.g. Brender, 2003, for
Israel, and Peltzman, 1992, for the US), and contrary to interpretations im-
plicit in most of the empirical PBC literature, results indicate that Colombian
voters penalize the incumbent party for running high deﬁcits. Furthermore,
high capital expenditures (interpreted here as targeted spending) increase
the share of votes obtained by the incumbent party, while current (“non-
targeted”) expenditure has no signiﬁcant eﬀect30. From column (1), a ten
percent increase in per capita investment increases the fraction of votes ob-
tained by the incumbent party by about 0.3%, while a two standard deviation
increase in the deﬁcit per capita decreases the share of votes to the incum-
bent party by close to 3.2%. These results are consistent with the view that
voters dislike incumbents who run high deﬁcits, while they value speciﬁc
types of expenditures. They are also consistent with the results on electoral
changes in the composition of spending discussed above, that show incum-
bents increasing targeted spending before the elections, while they try to
avoid concomitant increases in the overall budget. According to ﬁndings in
this section, this ﬁscal strategy is optimal in terms of maximizing the share
of votes that go to the incumbent party in the upcoming election.
Some summary statistics on projected voted shares are presented in Table
7. As discussed above, the high mean values for vote shares (both above 50%
in Table 8) are due to the high frequency of missing values for the vote
shares of one or other party, more prevalent in districts where the party is
not dominant. The projected vote shares exhibit less dispersion than the
actual shares. For each party, the projected share is positively correlated
29Af u l lﬁxed-eﬀects version cannot be used due to restrictions of the voting shares data:
for most localities we have no more than 1 usable observation.
30GDP growth does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect. This result is not surprising result
since my measure of GDP is at the state level. Voters probable do not “blame” the local
mayor for the state economy’s performance.
20with the actual share, and negatively correlated with the actual share for the
other party.
6 Electoral cycles in the central government’s
budget
Although I have argued that electoral cycles derived from the targeting of
expenditures are most relevant at the local level, where targeting is most
eﬃcient, this phenomenon is no stranger to national level politics. In fact,
the idea of pork projects is often associated by the public with Congress
politics. One question is, therefore, whether we also observe this type of
eﬀect at the national level. In this section, I take an exploratory look at that
question, focusing on the dynamics of some components of the Colombian
central government’s budget.
One problem for this exploration is the short length of the oﬃcial quar-
terly time series on ﬁscal policy, which begins in 1988. I gathered informa-
tion to extend those series, from the oﬃcial printed reports of the Contraloría
General on the ﬁnances of the government31. The resulting data are quarterly
frequency, and cover the 1974.1-2000.1 period. The level of disaggregation
is not as detailed as for the local data, but I can distinguish current from
investment spending, and two subcomponents of current spending: transfers
and personnel. The denomination transfers, again, refers to current trans-
fers, not the transfers from the central level to the local governments, which
are actually recorded as a part of investment. I therefore still regard transfers
as a non-targeted type of spending.
Elections occur at predetermined dates, every four years. Presidential
and Congressional elections are almost simultaneous (a two-month period
separates them), so I do not attempt to separate the eﬀect of Congressional
elections from that of a Presidential election. As controls, I use information
on unemployment, GDP and per capita GDP. Sources, deﬁnitions, and the
dates of presidential elections within the period are listed in the appendix.
I run a regression of the form:
31The Contraloría General is the same source I use for local ﬁscal data. It is the entity
that monitors the government’s ﬁnancial statements. More details on the construction of




bl ∗ yt−l + c ∗ xt−1 + d ∗ elecdumt + εt (7)
where yt i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fs o m et y p eo fg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gb e t w e e n
t−1 and t,a n dxt−1 is a control equal to the growth of either unemployment,
GDP, or per capita GDP, all in the previous period. elecdumt is the pre-
election dummy, which in this case takes the value of 1 in the two quarters
prior to President elections (which are also the quarter of Congress elections
and the preceding one), 0 in all others. I use L lags of the dependent variable,
where L is optimally chosen following the Akaike criterion.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 8. The table only
shows the estimates for the electoral eﬀect (d), and follows the same con-
ventions used in all other tables. Each column corresponds to a diﬀerent
control (unemployment, GDP, and per capita GDP for columns 1, 2, and 3
respectively). Robust standard errors are reported below the point estimates.
I obtain results that are broadly consistent with those observed for the
local level. The sign of the electoral eﬀe c ti sa l w a y sn e g a t i v ef o rt r a n s f e r s
and current spending, and positive for investment. However, while the eﬀect
on investment is always signiﬁcant, the negative eﬀect on current types of
spending is signiﬁcant only when controlling for unemployment.
I consider these results as indicative that the suggested pre-electoral
changes in the composition of government spending occur also at the na-
tional level. One interesting extension of these results would be to examine
the allocation of pre-electoral payments to the local governments (registered
under the investment heading), and relate these to the level of electoral polar-
ization that characterizes diﬀerent districts. At this point, however, the data
on regional allocations of central government expenditures are not readily
available.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper tries to oﬀer a more comprehensive view of electoral cycles in
government spending, integrating the pre-electoral ﬁscal choices of incum-
bents with the impact of those choices on election outcomes. The picture
that emerges is one where voters punish the pre-electoral deterioration of
ﬁscal balances but reward incumbents who, before the election, increase the
22provision of goods most valuable to voters. In terms of maximizing his proba-
bility of being re-elected, therefore, an incumbent’s optimal strategy implies
simultaneously increasing spending on those goods favored by voters and
contracting other types of spending. In the Colombian case, this is reﬂected
in pre-electoral shifts of resources away from current spending and into the
development of infrastructure-related projects.
T h ee v i d e n c ep r e s e n t e dh e r es h o w st h a tt h e r ei sal o g i ct oa p p a r e n t l y
contradictory pieces of previous evidence, which showed certain types of
government spending growing before elections despite voters’ inclination to
replace incumbents that chose high spending. It also suggests that the tra-
ditional view that incumbents have incentives to increase spending when
elections approach does not apply generally, even within the group of devel-
oping economies, which are frequently seen as the mecca of political budget
cycles. On the contrary, this evidence is consistent with models that pic-
ture the political budget cycle as electoral manipulation of the composition,
rather than the size of the budget. In the same vein, it is also consistent
with the argument that voters favor speciﬁc types of goods, and incumbents
attempt to inﬂuence electoral results by spending on those goods.
An interesting question that is left open is to what extent the greater
susceptibility of speciﬁc types of spending to electoral manipulation reﬂects
heterogeneous preferences of voters and politicians, as opposed to diﬀerent
degrees of visibility of public goods. In simpler, although inexact, words,
is the PBC more a reﬂection of pork politics, or competence signaling? Is
it perhaps even a reﬂection of incumbents pre-paying important campaign
contributors, rather than really trying to inﬂuence voters? The answer to
this question requires a diﬀerent kind of data and empirical strategy, possibly
diﬀerentiating electoral transfers to speciﬁcg r o u p so fv o t e r so rc o n t r i b u t o r s ,
and is part of a future research agenda.
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249 Appendix
9.1 Data for local level estimations
Population, and the UBN indicator were provided by the University of Los
Andes’ CEDE. State per capita GDP data are from DANE (the Colombian
Bureau of Statistics). Also, GDP for “new” states 32 is only reported since
1995. Previously, only the sum for all new states was reported. I impute pre-
1995 GDP for these new states by keeping the contribution of each state to
total new-states-GDP constant in its 1994-1996 level. The Unsatisﬁed Basic
Needs indicator (UBN) summarizes the fraction of households without proper
housing (in terms of number of rooms and construction materials), without
sanitary services, with school-less children, or with a single low income for
more than three people. This poverty indicator is commonly used with local-
level data, because at this level income measures needed to construct other
poverty indicators are not available.
Debt in speciﬁcation (3) (Table 2) corresponds to the sum of all deﬁcits
incurred by the city since 1984 until December of t−1.D e ﬁcit (speciﬁcation
(2)) is the deﬁcit at the end of the previous year. To construct the ﬁscal
dependence indicator, I ﬁrst calculate the average share of total revenue that
is represented by transfers of revenue from other levels of government. I use
the average over all regional units, because the decentralization eﬀect I try
to account for is a process dictated by national law. Let this average for year
t be denoted as ft. The Fiscal Dependence index used in the regressions is
calculated as:







where T is the total number of years. The FD t index is therefore close to 0 in
years of intermediate decentralization, positive in years of higher decentral-
ization, and negative in years of lower decentralization. In the regressions, I
interact FDt with the trend variable, to diﬀerentiate the trend eﬀects related
to the process of ﬁscal decentralization from any other trend eﬀects.
For the pre-1997 elections, I use electoral results recorded in the National
32There is a subset of nine states that were only elevated to the state category in 1991.
They were previously in a diﬀerent, now disappeared, category of the regional classiﬁcation.
These are what I call “new” states.
25Planning Department Databases, while for 1997 and 2000 I use oﬃcial results
directly provided by the Registraduría Nacional.
9.2 Data for national level estimations
National level ﬁscal data were taken from several issues of the Revista Informe
Financiero of the Contraloría General.Iu s et h eﬁgures for “Agreements”,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n dt op a y m e n t st h eg o v e r n m e n ti sc o m m i t t e dt om a k ei nt h e
period. To make the investment series consistent over time, the contributions
of the central level to the local governments were always included in the
deﬁnition of investment. Similarly, the deﬁnition of current transfers always
includes “operation contributions”.
The unemployment rate series is from DANE (the National Bureau of
Statistics). The original series has missing values for 78.2, 78.4, and 80.2,
which I ﬁlled using the average of adjacent quarters. GDP is only available
for 1977.1-1999.4, and no unique quarterly series covers the whole period; for
1977-1995 there is a series from the National Planning Department, while
DANE has been in charge of reporting quarterly GDP since 1994. Following
a practice that has become standard when working with Colombian data I
construct a unique series from the two by seasonally adjusting the pre-94
series to make it compatible with the DANE series, and then using growth
rates from one to extend the other.
269.3 Other results from estimating equation 5
Table A1 presents results on autoregressive terms, as well as Sargan test
statistics and numbers of observations, for the regressions ﬁrst introduced in
Table 3. Tables A2 and A3 present results of Arellano Bond estimations.
279.4 Electoral dates, and matching political movements
and the main parties
The ﬁrst mayor elections are in March 1988. Before 1994, local elections
occurred every two years, but the frequency has been extended to three
years since then. Table A4 lists years of mayor elections.
Presidential elections every four years at predetermined dates. Table A5.
lists the elections that occur within the period covered by the aggregate ﬁscal
data.
I use information in Pachón (2002), as well as informal consultations, to
link some movements to the traditional parties. I also consider as liberal
(conservative) a movement with the word “Liberal” (“Conservative”) in its
name. Table A6 lists the matches obtained (the left column lists the name
of the party as it appears in the oﬃcial records of election results).
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  Type of Expenditure Periods





Total Expenditure All 12.335           56.458       611.226      
Pre-electoral 5.294             53.445       586.009      
No pre-electoral 7.041             58.722       629.552      
1. Current Expenditure All 12.334           19.856       185.433      
Pre-electoral 5.293             18.521       176.970      
No pre-electoral 7.041             20.859       191.555      
     1.1. General Payments All 12.265           4.068         21.005        
Pre-electoral 5.244             3.851         21.914        
No pre-electoral 7.021             4.231         20.300        
     1.2. Personnel Exp. All 12.266           9.759         82.677        
Pre-electoral 5.245             9.195         80.810        
No pre-electoral 7.021             10.181       84.049        
     1.3. Current Transfers All 12.247           5.895         91.341        
Pre-electoral 5.234             5.069         78.904        
No pre-electoral 7.013             6.511         99.618        
2. Investment All 12.335           30.129       382.126      
Pre-electoral 5.294             29.162       365.423      
No pre-electoral 7.041             30.855       394.242      
     2.1. Infrastructure All 5.276             3.173         8.252          
Pre-electoral 2.007             3.523         7.372          
No pre-electoral 3.269             2.959         8.743          
     2.2. Water, Energy, and 
Comunications All 5.571             3.707         6.166          
Pre-electoral 2.113             4.270         7.101          
No pre-electoral 3.458             3.364         5.490          
     2.3. Housing All 7.365             761            4.069          
Pre-electoral 2.797             881            4.619          
No pre-electoral 4.568             687            3.691          
     2.4. Education All 7.469             3.615         5.523          
Pre-electoral 2.843             3.879         5.824          
No pre-electoral 4.626             3.453         5.324          
     2.5. Health All 7.469             2.710         5.007          
Pre-electoral 2.843             2.932         5.260          
No pre-electoral 4.626             2.574         4.840          
     2.6. Other
3. Debt service All 12.186           6.554         70.578        
Pre-electoral 5.224             5.843         66.884        
No pre-electoral 6.962             7.087         73.227        
Table 1. Summary statistics for different types of expenditureControl 123 4
T(t) x x x x
y(i,t-1) x x x x
log_GDP_PC(i,t-1) x x x x
log_UBN(i,t-1) x x x x
log_POPULATION(i,t-1) x x x x
DEFICIT(i,t-1) x x
DEBT_84(i,t-1) x
T*FISCAL_DEP(t) x x x
VOTE SHARE(i, prev.elect) x






















Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
1234
1. Current Expenditure -0.088 -0.081 -0.070 -0.079
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
1.1. General Payments -0.041 -0.001 0.006 0.016
(0.031) (0.043) (0.045) (0.051)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure 0.038 0.037 0.061 0.038
(0.018) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035)
     1.2.1 Personnel Temporary -0.466 -0.319 -0.206 -0.321
(0.282) (0.159) (0.146) (0.160)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.286 -0.444 -0.356 -0.418
(0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.082)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired -0.978 -0.849 -1.501 -0.688
                       workers (0.508) (0.403) (0.591) (0.364)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers -0.060 0.277 0.183 0.347
(0.118) (0.162) (0.147) (0.163)
2. Investment 0.106 0.075 0.081 0.080
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.421 0.413 0.382 0.361
(0.087) (0.097) (0.107) (0.117)
          2.1.1. Roads 0.401 0.377 0.394 0.350
(0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.085)
2.2. Water, Energy, and Com. 0.187 0.138 0.142 0.166
(0.074) (0.081) (0.074) (0.086)
2.3. Housing 0.032 -0.076 -0.006 0.304
(0.201) (0.224) (0.222) (0.195)
2.4. Education 0.037 0.004 0.003 0.018
(0.034) (0.046) (0.040) (0.046)
2.5. Health 0.018 0.012 -0.019 0.047
(0.067) (0.069) (0.062) (0.065)
3. Debt Service -0.104 -0.121 -0.102 -0.123
(0.037) (0.046) (0.043) (0.054)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 5. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is 
the share of total expenditure represented by a given category.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls, as detailed in table 2
Effect of elections on the composition of total expenditure (shares)
Table 3.Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
123 4
1. Current Expenditure -0.024 -0.033 -0.011 -0.041
(0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023)
1.1. General Payments 0.037 0.025 0.031 0.032
(0.027) (0.043) (0.041) (0.051)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure 0.071 0.082 0.087 0.084
(0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
     1.2.1 Personnel Temporary -0.546 -0.371 -0.303 -0.369
(0.252) (0.106) (0.100) (0.109)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.222 -0.369 -0.270 -0.332
(0.082) (0.101) (0.078) (0.123)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired -0.977 -0.826 -1.236 -0.659
                       workers (0.470) (0.437) (0.575) (0.396)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers 0.043 0.324 0.247 0.398
(0.125) (0.159) (0.150) (0.162)
2. Investment 0.142 0.126 0.144 0.122
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.436 0.452 0.507 0.376
(0.072) (0.077) (0.098) (0.083)
          2.1.1. Roads 0.365 0.392 0.412 0.318
(0.069) (0.076) (0.074) (0.078)
2.2. Water, Energy, and Com. 0.219 0.168 0.193 0.177
(0.065) (0.072) (0.077) (0.075)
2.3. Housing 0.124 0.028 0.100 0.432
(0.207) (0.232) (0.228) (0.212)
2.4. Education 0.110 0.083 0.090 0.090
(0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
2.5. Health 0.084 0.097 0.079 0.128
(0.054) (0.064) (0.061) (0.070)
3. Debt Service -0.053 -0.082 -0.104 -0.090
(0.031) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 5. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is 
the level of expenditure in each category.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls, as detailed in table 2
Effect of elections on different types of expenditure (levels)




Mean 60.74 57.36 70.06 56.91
Median 57.52 54.22 71.80 53.68
Panel 1: vote 
shares
25 percentile 39.08 34.47 45.11 48.28
75 percentile 93.22 92.23 96.92 62.45
Maximum 100 100 100 100





















Dependent Variable:               
Votes to party P
Investment as 
share of total
Regressor 1 2 3
Constant 32.801 - 31.412
(1.606) (1.702)
Votes to P in past election 0.485 0.384 0.512
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Deficit * incumbent -0.023 -0.023 -0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Investment Expenditure 2.757 1.734 5.313
*incumbent (0.805) (0.689) (1.614)
Current Expenditure 1.312 -0.928 -
*incumbent (0.787) (0.602)
GDP growth*incumbent -6.464 18.572 1.368
(16.070) (13.856) (16.562)
Observations 2032 2032 2032
R-square 0.222 0.187 0.222
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation 6
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 1 and 3 report Pooled OLS results, Column 2 reports OLS results with state/party effects
Incumbent is 1 if party P is in power at the time of the election, 0 otherwise
Expenditure variables in per capita 
terms
Table 6. Effect of fiscal performance on vote shares
 
 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Projected vote share Liberal 
party
62.881 15.076 32.534 81.459
Projected vote share 
Conservative party








Actual vote share 
Cons. party
Projected vote share Liberal 
party
1 0.416 -0.624 -0.209
Actual vote share Liberal 
party
1 -0.212 -0.581
Projected vote share 
Conservative party
1 0.510




Table 7. Summary statistics for fitted vote shares
 
 
Dependent variable: Type              Electoral effect (coefficient d)
of expenditure (1) (2) (3)
Total Expenditure 0.068 0.149 0.148
(0.105) (0.102) (0.102)
1. Current Expenditure -0.846 -1.543 -1.561
(0.103) (1.018) (1.020)
1.2. Personnel 
Expenditure 0.048 0.058 0.053
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.647 -0.052 -0.049
(0.105) (0.134) (0.133)
2. Investment 0.563 0.849 0.843
(0.262) (0.275) (0.275)
Notes: This table presents estimates for coefficient d in regression 7.
Estimation is done by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is a 
given type of government expenditure.
A different control in each: unemployment rate (1), GDP (2), per capita GDP (3)
Table 8. 




 Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs
1. Current Expenditure 0.071 0.025 19.699 9077 0.105 0.026 21.773 9077 0.192 0.077 20.545 9077 0.163 0.086 16.446 6924
(0.067) (0.042) (8) (0.085) (0.052) (6) (0.091) (0.049) (6) (0.086) (0.059) (6)
1.1. General Payments 0.097 -0.001 13.135 * 7046 0.111 0.030 12.144 * 7046 0.224 0.060 9.683 * 7046 0.107 0.028 14.530 6724
(0.063) (0.046) (8) (0.059) (0.066) (6) (0.077) (0.072) (6) (0.074) (0.079) (6)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure
0.303 -0.023 21.858 7119 0.384 0.077 11.985 * 7119 0.691 0.185 9.243 * 7119 0.224 0.028 10.581 * 6794
(0.099) (0.054) (8) (0.189) (0.075) (6) (0.187) (0.081) (6) (0.214) (0.088) (6)
     1.2.1 Personnel 
Temporary -0.012 0.056 10.185 * 630 -0.050 -0.006 8.490 * 630 -0.050 -0.002 8.324 * 630 -0.071 -0.015 8.508 * 591
(0.114) (0.126) (8) (0.123) (0.140) (6) (0.112) (0.128) (6) (0.126) (0.144) (6)
1.3. Current Transfers 0.189 0.043 29.309 6030 0.398 -0.033 13.571 6030 -0.265 -0.153 35.684 6030 0.422 -0.014 17.490 5786
(0.174) (0.064) (8) (0.227) (0.079) (6) (0.154) (0.057) (6) (0.219) (0.077) (6)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired 0.896 0.269 9.755 * 216 0.358 0.203 9.255 * 216 1.033 0.556 9.010 * 216 0.181 0.145 9.580 * 200
                       workers (0.467) (0.223) (8) (0.355) (0.214) (6) (0.428) (0.216) (6) (0.315) (0.213) (6)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers
-0.021 -0.086 5.678 * 2989 0.105 -0.090 4.885 * 2989 0.001 -0.146 5.426 * 2989 0.072 -0.118 4.035 * 2901
(0.066) (0.080) (8) (0.088) (0.087) (6) (0.096) (0.092) (6) (0.081) (0.088) (6)
2. Investment 0.325 0.067 11.945 * 6799 0.361 0.090 2.844 * 6799 0.389 0.105 5.329 * 6799 0.342 0.089 2.352 * 6484
(0.067) (0.033) (8) (0.079) (0.046) (6) (0.069) (0.039) (6) (0.087) (0.050) (6)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.028 0.017 8.207 * 1214 0.049 0.035 5.399 * 1214 0.032 0.022 5.302 * 1214 0.007 0.001 5.795 * 1135
0.080 (0.072) (8) 0.084 (0.084) (6) 0.128 (0.072) (6) 0.080 (0.087) (6)
      2.1.1 Roads -0.139 -0.060 15.340 * 1494 -0.050 -0.023 6.721 * 1494 -0.109 -0.036 12.965 1494 -0.094 -0.059 7.790 * 1394
(0.077) (0.048) (8) (0.077) (0.055) (6) (0.077) (0.049) (6) (0.076) (0.057) (6)
2.2. Water, Energy, and 
Com. -0.038 -0.076 8.323 * 1270 0.012 -0.037 5.535 * 1270 0.000 -0.066 4.596 * 1270 -0.006 -0.028 6.069 * 1185
(0.077) (0.061) (8) (0.083) (0.061) (6) (0.078) (0.055) (6) (0.087) (0.060) (6)
2.3. Housing 0.128 -0.086 2.075 * 631 0.082 -0.071 1.422 * 631 0.108 -0.100 1.990 * 631 0.145 -0.054 3.169 * 586
(0.106) (0.062) (8) (0.115) (0.074) (6) (0.111) (0.068) (6) (0.126) (0.071) (6)
2.4. Education 0.069 -0.037 6.463 * 1540 -0.001 -0.044 3.736 * 1540 0.003 -0.052 4.177 * 1540 -0.020 -0.059 3.349 * 1440
(0.109) (0.051) (8) (0.111) (0.057) (6) (0.104) (0.052) (6) (0.135) (0.073) (6)
2.5. Health -0.024 -0.094 10.255 * 1389 0.022 -0.125 4.185 * 1389 0.003 -0.076 3.441 * 1389 0.004 -0.131 4.800 * 1294
(0.078) (0.062) (8) (0.083) (0.056) (6) (0.075) (0.056) (6) (0.082) (0.056) (6)
3. Debt Service 0.268 0.117 9.647 * 3065 0.252 0.113 9.948 * 3065 0.284 0.121 10.320 * 3065 0.221 0.107 8.256 * 2889
(0.072) (0.042) (8) (0.076) (0.041) (6) (0.081) (0.044) (6) (0.083) (0.044) (6)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 5. Standard errors and degrees of freedom for Sargan test in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row correspond to a different regression, where the dependent variable is the share of total expenditure represented by a given category.
Each numbered group of columns corresponds to a different set of controls as detailed in table 3
* H0 in Sargan test was not rejected at 5% (H0: Instruments uncorrelated with the error term)
Table A1. Other results from regression on the effect of elections on different types of expenditure (shares). Complementary to Table 3.
1234Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
1234
1. Current Expenditure -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
1.1. General Payments -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure
-0.024 -0.016 -0.018 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
     1.2.1 Personnel Temporary -0.180 -0.162 -0.160 -0.004
(0.290) (0.288) (0.297) (0.299)
1.3. Current Transfers -0.021 -0.032 -0.031 -0.055
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
      1.3.1 Transfers to retired
-0.549 -0.491 -0.506 -0.489
                       workers (0.064) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054)
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers 0.105 0.140 0.142 0.150
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
2. Investment 0.046 0.051 0.051 0.026
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
2.1. Infrastructure 0.091 0.119 0.118 0.109
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
      2.1.1 Roads 0.086 0.112 0.111 0.102
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
2.2. Water, Energy, and Com.
0.128 0.126 0.126 0.120
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
2.3. Housing 0.367 0.460 0.461 0.493
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
2.4. Education -0.020 -0.053 -0.055 -0.063
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
2.5. Health -0.044 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
3. Debt Service -0.135 -0.159 -0.166 -0.184
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
This is an Arellano Bond Estimation. Estándar errors in parenthesis
Estimation is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row correspond to a different regressiion, where the dependent variable is a given type of 
expenditure.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls as detailed in table 3
effect of elections on the composition of total expenditure (shares)
Table A2. Arellano Bond estimation of the
 
 Dependent Variable: Type of 
expenditure
AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs AR1 AR2 Sargan Obs
1. Current Expenditure 0.307 0.238 7.432 * 7224 0.259 0.197 8.294 * 7224 0.102 0.147 9.719 * 7224 0.186 0.177 6.745 * 6892
(0.116) (0.062) (8) (0.133) (0.102) (6) (0.109) (0.055) (6) (0.153) (0.099) (6)
1.1. General Payments 0.195 0.148 11.432 * 7046 0.151 0.113 13.132 7046 0.192 0.114 11.166 * 7046 0.130 0.115 14.125 6724
(0.071) (0.061) (8) (0.071) (0.068) (6) (0.072) (0.070) (6) (0.070) (0.071) (6)
1.2. Personnel Expenditure
0.636 0.117 12.441 * 7119 0.563 0.087 5.967 * 7119 0.570 0.106 6.259 * 7119 0.622 0.120 6.519 * 6794
(0.097) (0.055) (8) (0.109) (0.053) (6) (0.112) (0.056) (6) (0.116) (0.058) (6)
     1.2.1 Personnel 
Temporary -0.116 -0.018 8.043 * 630 -0.146 -0.053 4.762 * 630 -0.040 0.088 3.618 * 630 -0.151 -0.048 5.010 * 591
(0.139) (0.142) (8) (0.132) (0.144) (6) (0.120) (0.128) (6) (0.132) (0.146) (6)
1.3. Current Transfers 0.449 0.166 22.293 6030 0.405 0.045 12.798 6030 0.299 0.043 25.019 6030 0.344 0.049 12.833 5786
(0.178) (0.071) (8) (0.213) (0.091) (6) (0.192) (0.072) (6) (0.228) (0.095) (6)
      1.3.1 Transfers to 
retired 0.770 0.074 10.451 * 216 0.150 -0.005 9.558 * 216 0.492 0.154 11.277 * 216 0.088 -0.029 9.459 * 200
                       workers (0.418) (0.210) (0.338) (0.218) (0.370) (0.202) 6.000 (0.318) (0.207) 6.000
      1.3.2.  Other Transfers
-0.006 -0.079 5.097 * 2989 0.069 -0.107 4.657 * 2989 -0.057 -0.179 5.375 * 2989 0.035 -0.135 4.163 * 2901
(0.066) (0.079) (8) (0.081) (0.087) (6) (0.095) (0.100) (6) (0.070) (0.089) (6)
2. Investment 0.251 0.034 11.791 * 6799 0.288 0.056 11.064 * 6799 0.389 0.103 7.055 6799 0.271 0.065 11.354 * 6484
(0.063) (0.029) (8) (0.074) (0.038) (6) (0.082) (0.043) (6) (0.077) (0.044) (6)
2.1. Infrastructure -0.157 -0.072 13.593 * 1214 -0.144 -0.050 9.094 * 1214 -0.218 -0.064 6.694 * 1214 -0.219 -0.089 10.473 * 1135
(0.076) (0.060) (8) (0.086) (0.064) (6) (0.090) (0.069) (6) (0.076) (0.066) (6)
      2.1.1 Roads -0.114 -0.164 12.885 * 1494 -0.081 -0.109 7.437 * 1494 -0.081 -0.100 7.900 * 1494 -0.146 -0.154 7.939 * 1394
(0.074) (0.057) (8) (0.083) (0.060) (6) (0.084) (0.057) (6) (0.072) (0.061) (6)
2.2. Water, Energy, and 
Com. 0.066 -0.005 5.461 * 1270 0.081 -0.005 5.573 * 1270 0.082 -0.008 4.399 * 1270 0.080 0.011 5.815 * 1185
(0.101) (0.062) (8) (0.109) (0.060) (6) (0.115) (0.056) (6) (0.112) (0.064) (6)
2.3. Housing 0.185 -0.059 2.490 * 631 0.164 -0.038 1.669 * 631 0.182 -0.075 2.292 * 631 0.211 -0.023 3.904 * 586
(0.138) (0.068) (8) (0.146) (0.082) (6) (0.146) (0.072) (6) (0.166) (0.078) (6)
2.4. Education 0.027 -0.003 12.963 * 1540 0.050 -0.003 11.178 * 1540 0.024 -0.005 11.506 * 1540 0.026 -0.012 10.441 * 1440
(0.074) (0.034) (8) (0.083) (0.035) (6) (0.080) (0.035) (6) (0.083) (0.034) (6)
2.5. Health -0.020 -0.041 15.152 * 1389 0.068 -0.024 8.251 * 1389 0.034 0.035 6.952 * 1389 0.101 0.011 8.227 * 1294
(0.078) (0.050) (8) (0.097) (0.062) (6) (0.093) (0.060) (6) (0.099) (0.067) (6)
3. Debt Service 0.302 0.153 10.118 * 3065 0.334 0.165 6.518 * 3065 0.344 0.163 5.351 * 3065 0.351 0.175 6.008 * 2889
(0.060) (0.044) (8) (0.065) (0.042) (6) (0.066) (0.042) (6) (0.072) (0.044) (6)
This is a GMM estimation of equation 5. Standard errors and degrees of freedom for Sargan test in parenthesis.
Estimate is significant at 5% level if in bold characters, at 10% if in bold and italics.
Each row correspond to a different regression, where the dependent variable is the level of expenditure in a given category.
Each numbered group of columns corresponds to a different set of controls as detailed in table 3
* H0 in Sargan test was not rejected at 5% (H0: Instruments uncorrelated with the error term)
Table A3. Other results from regression on the effect of elections on different types of expenditure (levels) Complementary to Table 4.
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May 1976 1975.4 and 1976.1
May 1978 1977.4 and 1978.1
May 1982 1981.4 and 1982.1
May 1986 1985.4 and 1986.1
May 1990 1989.4 and 1990.1
May 1994 1993.4 and 1994.1
May 1998 1997.4 and 1998.1
May 2002 2001.4 and 2002.1




Party or Movement Mapping to Larger Parties




Liberalismo Ind. De Restauración Liberal
Movimiento Convergencia Popular Cívica Liberal
Movimiento Independiente Liberal Mil Liberal
Movimiento Renovador de Acción Liberal-Mor Liberal
Nuevo Liberalismo Liberal
Partido Conservador Colombiano Conservative
Movimiento Conservatismo Independiente Conservative
Movimiento de Integración Regional Conservative
Movimiento de Participación Popular Conservative
Movimiento Humbertista Conservative
Movimiento Nacional Conservador Conservative
Movimiento Único de Renovación Conservadora Conservative
Movimiento de Salvación Nacional Conservative
Movimiento Nueva Fuerza Democrática Conservative
Movimiento Progresismo Democrático Conservative
Movimiento Unionista Conservative
Ad. M-19 M-19
Unión Patriótica UP UP
Table A6. Party correspondences
 